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CHAPTER 13 Collective Cultural Claims before the International Court of Justice 
Eleni Polymenopoulou 
1. Introduction
In the aftermath of the Second World War, when the system of the United Nations was 
created, granting rights to collectivities was not a United Nations priority. Collective rights, 
and, a fortiori, the right of groups ‘to protect and develop their own particular cultural 
characteristics’1 were, at that time, seen as a peril to the establishment of the international 
human rights system. ‘Groups’ meant division, discord, conflict, and disparity. Ultimately, 
they meant war. Hence, affirming different cultural identities with an imprecise scope, nature 
and boundaries, and discriminating among individuals on the basis of their belonging to a 
group, was considered something inherently contradictory to human rights. In addition, as the 
former Director-General of UNESCO Koichiro Matsuura observes, the meaning of the word 
‘culture’ back in the 1945 would refer to arts and the letters, rather than to a group right ‘to be 
different’.2 
In light of these observations, when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was established,3 
its mandate did not explicitly include minority and group rights issues, as did that of its 
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (‘PCIJ’). The latter, in addition to 
1 Douglas Sanders, ‘Collective Rights’ (1991) 13 HRQ 368, 369. 
2 Koichiro Matsuura, ‘L’enjeu culturel au cœur des relations internationales’ (2006) 4 Politique Étrangère 1045, 
1048. 
3 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, signed on 26 June 1945, entered 
into force on 24 October 1945), 1 UNTS XVI, amended in 1963 (557 UNTS 143), in 1965 (638 UNTS 308), 
and in 1971 (892 UNTS 119).  
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its general competence to consider any legal question that the states would bring to its 
attention,4 had explicit jurisdiction over the numerous minority treaties that existed under the 
regime of the League of the Nations.5 Not surprisingly, this then- World Court issued 
numerous opinions and judgements on cases and issues related to minority rights, and several 
of its findings constitute a source of inspiration in minority rights enforcement and 
adjudication even today. For instance, in the case of Minority Schools of Upper Silesia 
(1928), the PCIJ discussed the question of the admission criteria of children speaking 
languages other than the official Polish language to the minority schools of Upper Silesia – 
and the subsequent rights of their parents to choose the language of instruction– noting that 
‘every national has the right freely to declare, according to his conscience and on his personal 
responsibility, that he does or does not belong to a racial, linguistic or religious minority, and 
to declare what is the language of a pupil or child for whose education he is legally 
responsible.’6 In the case of Greco-Bulgarian “Communities” (1930),7 it gave an interesting 
 
4Arts 13 and 14 of the Covenant of the League of the Nations, adopted on 28 June 1919, entered into force on 10 
January 1920, 225 Parry’s CTS 195, and Art. 36 of the Statute of the PCIJ, Protocol of 16 December 1920, 
amended 14 September 1929; available at 
<http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/documents/1920.12.16_statute.htm> accessed on 15 December 2015. 
5 See ‘Documents presented by the Advisory Committee of Jurists to the Committee relating to existing plans 
for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice (1920)’ 109 (ch VII on the ‘Competence of 
the Court as the Ultimate Tribunal of Civilisation’). 
6 Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools), Judgment of 26 April 1928, PCIJ Ser. A, No. 15, 
Fourth Annual Report of the PCIJ (15 June 1927—15 June 1928), Ser. E, No. 4, 210, reprinted in UN Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.F/1/Add.4 (2012), 141, at 145. Cfr. German Minority Schools in Upper Silesia, Advisory Opinion 
of 15 May 1931, PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 40, Seventh Annual Report of the PCIJ (15 June 1930—15 June 1931), 
Ser. E, No. 7, 261, reprinted in UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.F/1/Add.4 (2012), 223. 
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description of the characteristics of a ‘community’, which encompassed religion, language 
and tradition, along with the ‘sentiment of solidarity with a view to preserving their 
traditions’,8 and noted, memorably, that the existence of these communities was ‘a question 
of fact not dependent of any regulation resulting from the local law’.9 Even more notably, in 
the advisory opinion regarding the Minority Schools in Albania (1935)10 it employed a broad 
reading of Albania’s international obligations with respect to the religious and educational 
autonomy enjoyed by the Greek minority in Albania.11 According to the PCIJ, the League of 
Nations’ minority legal regime provided for substantial equality, since not only did it 
embrace the principle of ‘perfect equality between nationals belonging to the minority and 
other nationals’, but further, ‘grant[ed] to minorities of suitable means for the preservation of 
their racial peculiarities, their traditions and their characteristics’.12  
 
 
7 Greco-Bulgarian “Communities”, Advisory Opinion of 31 July 1930, PCIJ Ser. B, No. 17, Seventh Annual 
Report of the PCIJ (15 June 1930—15 June 1931), Ser. E, No. 7, reprinted in UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.F/1/Add.4 
(2012), 203. 
8 Ibid 205: ‘The criterion for determining what is a community(…) is the existence of a group of persons living 
in a given country or locality having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own, and united by this 
identity of race, religion, language and traditions in a sentiment of solidarity with a view to preserving their 
traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instruction and up-bringing of their children in 
accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and mutually assisting each other’. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion of 6 April 1935, PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 64, Eleventh Annual 
Report of the PCIJ (15 June 1934–15 June 1935), Ser. E, No. 11, 214, reprinted in UN Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.F/1/Add.4 (2012), 348.  
11 See Declaration concerning the Protection of Minorities in Albania, signed on 2 October 1921, 9 LNTS 175. 
12 Minority Schools in Albania (n 10) 351. 
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The assumption that the ICJ is, generally, not competent to address collective cultural claims 
merely because it does not have an explicit mandate to do so is misleading. In fact, the Court 
is competent to deal with any sort of dispute between states, as well as with the interpretation 
of any United Nations (UN) Treaty.13 This means that the examination of collective cultural 
claims is a priori not excluded from the Court’s competence. And indeed, such issues may be 
examined by the Court, either as legal issues in the framework of an inter-state complaint, or 
as features of an advisory opinion. It seems that only practical impediments are currently 
restricting the actual number of cases touching upon questions of collective rights. First of all, 
there is the fact that the ICJ Statute does not recognise standing for any collective entities 
other than States parties to the Charter.14 Therefore, minorities, or indigenous peoples, even 
though they are specially singled out in UN treaties as collectivities and would be potentially 
interested in raising collective cultural issues before the Court, are excluded from standing.15 
The second and corollary impediment is one of likelihood, or more accurately the lack 
thereof. While the jurisdiction of the Court indeed ‘comprises all cases which the parties refer 
to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties 
and conventions in force,’16 it seems quite unlikely that the interests of collectivities to 
 
13 Art. 36(2) of the ICJ Statute; available at < http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2> accessed on 15 
December 2015. 
14 Art. 34(1) of the ICJ: ‘Only states may be parties in cases before the Court’.  
15 Thus, a United Nations information leaflet notes that ‘the International Court of Justice (…) has a limited role 
in considering human rights violations. The Court considers only disputes between governments and does not 
receive submissions from individuals, it is unlikely that indigenous peoples will have occasion to work with the 
International Court of Justice’, see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), ‘Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations System: An overview’; available at < 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideIPleaflet1en.pdf> accessed on 29 January 2016.  
16 Art. 36(1) of the ICJ Statute. 
5 
 
preserve their cultural identities would either coincide or significantly affect the interests of a 
state to the point that the latter would take such a case to the ICJ.   
 
Yet, the international law developments of the last decade have also had an impact on the ICJ 
case law. As the highest World jurisdiction, the ICJ does not, and cannot, operate in a 
vacuum. Therefore, it cannot remain indifferent to the expansion of debates on culture and 
cultural rights,17 and the subsequent increase of their justiciability, either by means of 
recognition in regional and international instruments (including soft law instruments),18 or 
 
17 See generally, Silvia Borelli and Federico Lenzerini (eds), Cultural Heritage, Cultural Rights, Cultural 
Diversity: New Developments in International Law (Nijhoff, 2012).  
18 As an indication only, see the establishment of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNGA Res.63/117, adopted on 10 December 2008, entered into force 5 
May 2013, UN Doc. A/RES/63/117); the proclamation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP; UNGA Res. 61/295, adopted on 13 September 2007, UN Doc. A/RES/61/295), in particular 
Art. 8 regarding their right ‘not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture’, and the 
corresponding para 2 regarding states’ obligations to ‘provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and 
redress for: (a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or 
of their cultural values or ethnic identities (…)’, and Art. 11 on their right to practise and revitalize their cultural 
traditions and customs, and Art. 12 on their right to ‘manifest, practise, develop and teach their spiritual and 
religious traditions, customs and ceremonies’; the proposed Nordic Saami Convention to be adopted by Norway, 
Sweden and Finland as intended to ‘affirm and strengthen such rights of the Saami people that are necessary to 
secure and develop its language, its culture, its livelihoods and society, with the smallest possible interference of 
the national borders’ (Art. 1) (available at 
<https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/AID/temadokumenter/sami/sami_samekonv_engelsk.pdf> 
accessed on 15 December 2015); Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions (adopted on 20 October 2005, entered into force 18 March 2007, 2440 UNTS 311), for example 
Art. 5(2), which states that ‘when a Party implements policies and takes measures to protect and promote the 
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enforcement by domestic,19 regional20 and other international mechanisms21 of human rights 
protection. In recent years a number of Judges with significant experience in human rights 
 
diversity of cultural expressions within its territory, its policies and measures shall be consistent with the 
provisions of this Convention’. See also Chapter 11 by Francesco Francioni in this volume. 
19 See, for example, Malcolm Langford, ‘Domestic Adjudication and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Socio-Legal Review’ (2009) 6 SUR International Journal of Human Rights 91. 
20 See the pioneering role of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in promoting peoples’ rights , inter alia 
in the cases: Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tigni Community v Nicaragua, Judgment of 31 August 2001, 79 IACtHR 
(Ser. C), No. 79 (2001); Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Judgment of 17 June 2005, IACtHR 
(Ser. C), No. 125 (2005); Saramaka People v Suriname, Judgment of 28 November 2007, IACtHR (Ser. C), No. 
172 (2007). Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador, Judgment of 27 June 2012, IACtHR (Ser. C), 
No. 245 (2012). Further read Chapter 10 by Kristin Hausler in this volume. See also the recent cases before the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre 
for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria (Ogoni case), AfCHPR, Comm. No. 155/96, 27 May 2002; Centre for 
Minority Rights Development and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya, 
AfCHPR, Comm. No. 276/03, 4 February 2010. Further read Chapter 9 by Folarin Shyllon in this volume. 
Even the European Court of Human Rights has made contributions to the enhancement of collective rights over 
the last few years through a dynamic interpretation of the European Convention (ECHR); see, for example ,the 
cases regarding non-segregation in education for Roma minorities: Oršuš and Others v Croatia, Application No. 
15766/03, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 16 March 2010, ECHR (2010), and D.H. and Others v the Czech 
Republic, Application No. 57325/00 Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 13 November 2007, ECHR 2007-IV. 
Also see Tănase v Moldova, Application No. 7/08, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 27 April 2010, ECHR 
(2010) and Tunceli Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği v Turkey, Application No. 61353/00, 10 October 2006, ECHR 
(2010). Cfr Chapter 4 by Yvonne Donders in this volume, at Section 5.2.  
21  Issues related to cultural heritage protection have been examined in the context of prosecutions and trials 
before both the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Human Rights Chamber 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the International Criminal Court (ICC), where it has also been noted that 
the destruction of cultural heritage is a war crime according to both the ICTY and the ICC statute. Additionally, 
the Rome Statute (Art. 7, para 1h] explicitly establishes that persecution against any identifiable group or 
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adjudication have joined the Court.22 It seems that this evolution affects the interpretation of 
international law by the Court. Hence, the Court has expanded its jurisdiction in a way so as 
to progressively substantiate its contributions to human rights protection.23 This is indeed 
noteworthy since the Court is the highest authority on the interpretation and application of 
international law.    
 
 
collectivity on, inter alia, ethnic, cultural and religious grounds is a crime against humanity ‘when committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population’. Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (State of Rome), adopted on 17 July 1998, entered into force on 1 July 2002, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9, 2187 UNTS 90. Further read Federico Lenzerini, ‘The Role of International and Mixed 
Criminal Courts in the Enforcement of International Norms Concerning the Protection of Cultural Heritage’ in 
Francesco Francioni and James Gordley (eds), Enforcing International Cultural Heritage Law (OUP, 2013) 40. 
22 Current Judges of the Court include Judge Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, former President of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights; Judge Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, former Legal Adviser to the UNESCO; 
Christopher Greenwood and Ronny Abraham (President of the Court since 2015),who both have been councils 
inter alia before the European court of Human rights. Other individuals with significant human rights expertise 
have also been members of the Court in the last decade, including most notably Rosalyn Higgins (1995–2009 
and President of the Court during 2005–2009), Pieter Kooijmans (1997–2006), Thomas Buergenthal (2000–
2010) and Bruno Simma (2003–2012). On this point, see Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Human Rights in the International 
Court of Justice’ (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 745, 746.  
23 As an indication only, cases with human rights interest include, for example, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic 
of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment of 24 May 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, 582; Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment of 19 
December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, 168. See generally Higgins ‘Human Rights’ (n 22) 745ff; also see Gentian 
Zyberi, ‘The Development and Interpretation of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Rules and 
Principles through the Case-Law of the International Court of Justice’ (2007) 25 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 117. 
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2. The ICJ’s Cautious Approach to the Recognition of Collective Cultural Claims    
 
The increased importance attributed to human rights does not mean that minority rights and 
indigenous peoples’ claims are now reaching the Court. States are still the only actors to have 
locus standi before the Court,24 and an actio popularis brought before the Court is still 
prohibited.25 Nevertheless, in a number of cases collective cultural claims may reach the 
Court through states’ submissions. The following situations may be distinguished: 1) national 
cultural claims advanced by states; 2) minority cultural claims advanced by states; 3) 
indigenous peoples’ cultural claims advanced by states. 
 
2.1. National Cultural Claims Advanced by States   
 
It may happen that a state advances collective cultural claims as its own national claim. Such 
a situation may arise when self-identified nation-states enjoying a high percentage of ethnic, 
cultural and religious homogeneity advance collective cultural claims in the name of the 
nation as a whole.    
 
24 For the views of some authors voicing the necessity for reform of the ICJ Statute, see, for example, Paul 
Magnarella, ‘Expanding the Role of the International Court of Justice to Resolve Interethnic Conflict and 
Protect Minority Rights’ (1993) Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 103;  also see James Anaya, ‘The 
Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims’ (1990) 75 Iowa Law Review 
837. 
25 South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa), Second Phase, Judgment of 18 
July 1966, ICJ Reports 1966, 6, para 88: ‘the argument amounts to a plea that the Court should allow the 
equivalent of an actio popularis, or right resident in any member of a community to take legal action in 
vindication of a public interest. But although a right of this kind may be known to certain municipal systems of 
law, it is not known to international law as it stands at present: nor is the Court able to regard it as imported by 







Such an issue has arisen, for instance, in the context of the Republic of Macedonia v Greece 
case (2011).26 The case concerned Greece’s objection to Macedonia’s admission to the 
NATO, and its failure to comply with the relevant Interim accord; yet, in substance, it 
concerned the use of the name ‘Macedonia’, to which both Parties had legal interests in (this 
was the main reason the Greek objected to the Applicant’s membership). Greece’s allegations 
about Macedonia’s failure to comply with its obligations under the Interim Accord included 
allegations about its illicit use of historical or cultural symbols. In particular, Greece, a self-
identified nation-state with a high percentage of ethnic, cultural and religious homogeneity, 
highlighted that Macedonia had breached its obligation emanating from the Interim accord in 
a variety of ways, including allowing to its army to use the Macedonian symbol on its flags,27 
and ‘by issuing stamps, erecting statues and renaming the airport of the capital’.28 The Court 
was not persuaded by Greece’s arguments, that is, by its objection to Macedonia’s admission 
to NATO was justified as a response to material breaches of the Interim Accord (even though 
 
26 Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v 
Greece), Judgment of 5 December 2011, ICJ Reports 2011, 644. 
27 Ibid paras 154–59, regarding the respondent’s alleged breach of Art. 7(3) of the Interim Accord, which 
provided that: ‘if either Party believes one or more symbols constituting part of its historic or cultural patrimony 
is being used by the other Party, it shall bring such alleged use to the attention of the other Party, and the other 
Party shall take appropriate corrective action or indicate why it does not consider it necessary to do so’. 
28 Ibid paras 148–53, regarding the respondent’s alleged breach of Art 7(2) of the Interim Accord, which 
provided that: ‘Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the Second Part shall cease to use in 
any way the symbol in all its forms displayed on its national flag prior to such entry into force.’ 
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it found one exceptional use of the name by Macedonia, in 2004, four years prior Greece’s 
objection).29 Interestingly, Judge Roucounas, sitting as an ad hoc judge for Greece, dissented, 
asserting that the Court should not have taken jurisdiction over the case precisely because 
important cultural, historical, and national issues were at stake.30  
 
In the past, in the context of colonisation and territorial mandates, it also happened that states 
would advance cultural claims (claims to education, religion, language, protection of heritage 
and cultural identity etc.) as their own peoples’ claims, with respect to the coloniser or the 
policies of the mandate holder. Here one may consider, in particular, the South West Africa 
judgement,31 where several claims of the previously colonised Ethiopia and Liberia were of a 
‘cultural’ nature.32 A key issue in this case was to consider the concept of ‘civilisation’ and 
examine whether the interpretation of the relevant colonial treaties ‘intended to give juridical 
expression to the notion of the ‘sacred trust of civilization’. Despite its expression of 
intention to explore the question further,33 the Court failed to address the concept of 
 
29 Ibid paras 161–62. 
30 Dissenting opinion of ad hoc Judge Roucounas, paras 23–4: ‘by upholding the Applicant’s claim and finding 
that it has jurisdiction, the Court has involved itself in the intricacies of the Parties’ political and cultural 
relations with each other and with the international organization in question (…) a composite reading of the 
Accord would have enabled the Court to discern in the text the need to take account of the historical and cultural 
elements which loom large over the case and to distance itself from the reactions, both political and on the 
popular psychological level, which are liable to be aroused on either side by the Judgment’. 
31 South West Africa, Judgment of 18 July 1966 (n 25). 
32 Memorials of Liberia and Ethiopia, para 4, cited in the Judgment (at 12). The claims were mostly related to 
the economic, political, social and educational policies applied in the claimants’ territories, since the Applicants 
had submitted to the Court that the mandate power had ‘failed to promote to the utmost the material and moral 
well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory’. 
33 Ibid para 51. 
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‘civilization’ from a ‘culturally sensitive’ perspective, contenting itself with stating that ‘as 
such, it constitutes a moral ideal given form as a juridical régime in the shape of that system’ 
and that ‘it is necessary not to confuse the moral ideal with the legal rules intended to give it 
effect’.34  
 
2.2. Minority Cultural Claims Advanced by States 
   
The second identifiable situation in which a state may raise cultural claims concerns instances 
in which a state has interests in raising the issue of minority rights protection. Such situation 
may arise, for example, in the case of an on-going ethnic or religious conflict, or when a 
minority group sees the right to its cultural heritage being violated.  
 
The question of cultural genocide, that is, the full and complete destruction of a group’s 
cultural identity as part of a policy of ethnic cleansing35 naturally comes up as the first 
example of such situation.36 This issue has been raised before the ICJ in two cases whereby 
 
34 Ibid para 52. 
35 At the international level, the issue has been extensively discussed when drafting both the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGA Res. 260A(III), adopted on 9 December 1948, 
entered into force on 12 January 1951, 78 UNTS 277) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNGA 
Res 217 A(III), adopted on 10 December 1948, UN Doc A/810, 71): in the former, the Sixth Committee’s 
travaux preparatoires explicitly excluded cultural genocide from the list of punishable acts, while in the latter, 
an additional provision related to minority rights – which could, eventually, provide for protection against 
cultural genocide – did not attain a sufficient number of voters. See ‘Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its Forty-eighth Session’ (1996) 2(2) Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 45–46, para. 12. See also Johannes Morsink, ‘Cultural Genocide, the Universal Declaration, and 
Minority Rights’ (1999) 21 HRQ 1016, 1051. 
36 For a comprehensive analysis of this topic see Chapter 14 by Elisa Novic in this volume. 
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proceedings were initiated against Serbia – the Bosnian Genocide case, which led to a 2007 
judgement,37 and the Croatia v Serbia case, which was decided by the ICJ in 2015.38 In the 
first, Bosnia and Herzegovina complained about Serbian attempts to eradicate ‘all traces of 
the culture of the protected group through the destruction of historical, religious and cultural 
property’.39 ; the ICJ held that such a crime could not be recognized as punishable under the 
Genocide Convention, even though it did recognize that there was ‘conclusive evidence of 
the deliberate destruction of the historical, cultural and religious heritage of the protected 
group during the period in question’.40 In the second, Croatia submitted to the Court that the 
looting of its cultural property amounted to a breach of the Convention and to the destruction 
of the Bosnian Muslim cultural identity, requesting ‘to return to the Applicant any items of 
cultural property within its jurisdiction or control which were seized in the course of the 
genocidal acts for which it is responsible’.41 The question came again to examination since 
Croatia, just like Bosnia, claimed before the Court that it perceived the destruction of its 
cultural heritage as part of a broader plan aiming at the extinction of the Croatians as an 
ethnic group – something that would fall, by implication, under the Genocide Convention. 
The Court citing the judgement in the Bosnian genocide case, found once again that the act of 
 
37 Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, 43. 
38 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v 
Serbia), Judgment of 3 February 2015; available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/118/18422.pdf> 
accessed on 15 December 2015. 
39 Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro, Judgment of 26 February 2007 (n 37) para 320.  
40 Ibid para 344. 
41 Croatia v Serbia, Judgment of 18 November 2008 (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports 2008, 412, 
Preliminary Objections, 18 November 2008, paras 21.2(c), 140. 
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genocide was not substantiated, recognizing however, that such attacks on cultural and 
religious property may, eventually, establish ‘genocidal intent’. 42 
 
A second example of protection of minority interest by a state can arise when the latter acts 
as a kin state, with interests in protecting the rights of its own ethnic and national minorities 
residing in a neighbouring state. The Case Concerning Application of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,43 brought by Georgia 
against Russia, may serve as a good illustration of a state bringing collective cultural claims 
to the ICJ. The case concerned the disputes that took place between Russia and Georgia in the 
period from 1992 to 2008, and which affected the Georgian minorities living in Russia 
(Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Georgia’s complaints44 were largely based on cultural 
collective claims. The applicant state in fact, not only complained about racial segregation 
and policies inciting to hatred; it further discussed in its memorial questions of assimilation 
(what Georgia saw as a generalised plan to create ‘ethnically pure territories aligned with the 
Russian Federation’) and racial discrimination to the point of constituting a policy of ethnic 
cleansing, that is, the destruction of the ‘Georgian culture and identity by discriminatory 
legislation and other means’.45 The Court nevertheless declared itself unable to examine the 
claim further due to lack of competence, since Georgia had not attempted to resolve the 
issues through negotiations according to its obligations under ICERD, prior reaching the 
Court.  
 
42 Croatia v Serbia, Judgment of 3 February 2015 (merits) (n 38) para 142.  
43 Georgia v Russian Federation, Judgment of 1 April 2011 (preliminary objections), ICJ Reports 2011, 70.  
44 Based on Arts. 2 (1)(a), 2 (1)(b), 2 (1)(d), 3 and 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (‘ICERD’), UNGA Res. 2106(XX), adopted on 21 December 1965, entered into 
force on 4 January 1969, 660 UNTS 195. 




2.3. Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Claims Advanced by States    
 
Thirdly, states may also advance the cultural interests of indigenous peoples as an issue to be 
considered by the ICJ, if such is deemed beneficial to their own interests. Such a situation 
may occur, for example, with respect to the interpretation of the uti possidetis juris 
principle.46   
 
The ICJ, despite initially recognising that uti possidetis’s precise function is to limit self-
determination claims,47 has however admitted some flexibility in its application. It has 
therefore observed that the uti possidetis does not necessarily entail that the boundaries fixed 
by Treaty on a certain critical date are ‘frozen’ for an indeterminate period of time, and that 
eventually the doctrines of acquiescence or recognition, or some other legal principle such as, 
for example, prescription may come into play.48 Consequently, a state would have legitimate 
 
46 Uti possidetis, just like terra nullius, is a judicial construction borrowed from Roman private law, and 
traditionally perceived as hostile to collective rights, since its main function is to delineate State boundaries (as 
demarcated by Western colonisers) at the expense of peoples’ rights to self- determination and land rights. See 
Malcolm Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries’ (1997) 8 EJIL 478, 481 and Malcolm Shaw, ‘The 
Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today’ (1996) BYIL 97, 98; also see Joshua 
Castellino, ‘Territorial Integrity and the “Right” to Self-Determination: An Examination of the Conceptual 
Tools’ (2008) 33 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 499, 502. 
47 See Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali), Judgment of 22 December 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 
554, para 26. In this judgment the Court explicitly clarified that newly autonomous states would need ‘to take 
account of it in the interpretation of the principle of self-determination of peoples’ (para 25); on this point, see 
Shaw ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries’ (n 46) 481.  
48 Case Concerning The Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras: Nicaragua 
Intervening), Judgment of 11 September 1992, ICJ Reports 1992, 351, para 67: ‘a later critical date clearly may 
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reasons to claim sovereignty over a territory, as long as it could prove that the uti possidetis 
could be qualified. And indeed, newly independent states, in order to demonstrate a 
manifestation of territorial sovereignty, have sometimes used – or misused – the fact of the 
presence of inhabitants of a certain territory, despite their lack of possession of any relevant 
title.49 Most commonly, these inhabitants are indigenous peoples, even though they are not 
referred to as such (in states’ submissions, as in the Court’s judgements, phrases such as 
‘communities’ and ‘populations’ are generally preferred). As to the Court’s consideration of 
the states’ positions, a distinction should be made between advisory opinions and contentious 
jurisdiction.  
 
a) Indigenous peoples’ cultural claims advanced by States in the context of the Court’s 
contentious jurisdiction  
 
In the context of advisory opinions, the Court has been somewhat more generous in 
recognising cultural aspects of collective claims (such as claims to self-determination). Yet, 
here again it has been cautious about making assumptions that extend its jurisdiction to 
questions which have not been asked.  
 
arise, for example, either from adjudication or from a boundary treaty (…) if the uti possidetis juris position can 
be qualified by adjudication and by treaty, the question then arises whether it can be qualified in other ways, for 
example, by acquiescence or recognition. There seems to be no reason in principle why these factors should not 
operate, where there is sufficient evidence to show that the parties have in effect clearly accepted a variation, or 
at least an interpretation, of the uti possidetis juris position’. 
49 See The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v United Kingdom), Judgment of 17 November 1953, ICJ 
Reports 1953, 47, at 57: ‘what is of decisive importance, in the opinion of the Court, is not indirect 
presumptions deduced from events in the Middle Ages, but the evidence which relates directly to the possession 




In the Land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria,50 one of the arguments 
that Nigeria used to entrench its territorial sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula and certain 
Lake Chad villages (mostly fishing villages) was the historic consolidation of its title over the 
disputed areas and the acquiescence of Cameroon. The presence of indigenous peoples 
(Calabar people, according to Nigeria)51 and their ‘exclusive association’ with the Nigerian 
State,52 was therefore a crucial point of the argument. Hence Nigeria, in its submissions to the 
Court, discussed ‘the attitude and affiliations of the population of Darak and the other Lake 
Chad villages[…]’ and the ‘existence of historical links with Nigeria in the area’,53 
extensively describing these communities’ culture – particularly their educational system, 
their religious institutions, and their traditional way of life (which included subsistence 
agriculture and fishing, as well as the maintenance of the system of traditional chiefs – the 
‘Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar’).54 In contrast, Cameroon highlighted the economic 
considerations of Nigeria in claiming the disputed territory, pointing out the natural 
resources, particularly oil and halieutic profits,55 and explained that the argument regarding 
the presence of peoples on the islands of Lake Chad was particularly misleading given the 
 
50 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea 
intervening), Judgment of 10 October 2002, ICJ Reports 2002, 303. 
51 Even though throughout the memorial they are rather mentioned as ‘inhabitants’, and in the Judgment as 
‘communities’, see Cameroon v Nigeria, Judgment of 10 October 2002 (n 50) para 218. 
52 Cameroon v Nigeria, Counter-Memorial of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Vol. 1 (Chapters 1–11), 21 May 
1999, 432, para 17.71 (conclusions). The Nigerian claims were therefore based on a historical consolidation of 
title and peaceful possession. 
53 Ibid, 196ff. (the existence of legal ties of a ‘traditional, administrative, economic and social’ nature). 
54 Ibid, Chapters 9–10 of the Counter-Memorial, in which Nigeria attempts to demonstrate the historic 
consolidation of its title. 
55 Cameroon v Nigeria, Cameroon’s Memorial, 16 March 1996, 23, paras 340–41 (available only in French). 
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increasing problem of dryness in the area.56 The Court did not consider the arguments related 
to the presence of ‘communities’ and indigenous peoples in the case, since Cameroon already 
possessed  title. The Court found that there was no Nigerian title capable of being confirmed 
subsequently by ‘long occupation’ (only titles concluded between Nigeria and the indigenous 
chiefs), and therefore the argument of historic consolidation could not stand as such. 
Regarding the claim on education authorities (and the religious schools in particular), the 
Court again noted that these were effectivités, not sufficient to reverse the established title of 
Cameroon.57 
 
The Territorial Dispute case (1994) between Libya and Chad58 was a similar case involving 
sovereignty over the – rich in petrol – Aouzou Strip. One of the main claims of Libya was 
that there existed ‘a community of title between the title of the indigenous peoples, and the 
rights and titles of the Ottoman Empire, passed on to Italy in 1912 and inherited by Libya in 
1951’.59 Akin to Nigeria, Libya referred to the indigenous and tribal groups presence on the 
disputed territory, whose conduct was equally crucial for the outcome of the dispute,60 in 
order to demonstrate its sovereignty over the territory. In its memorial submitted to the Court, 
 
56 Ibid 23–4, para 341 (available only in French:  ‘Quant au Lac Tchad, il est en voie d'assèchement de et les 
eaux du lac se sont pratiquement retirées du Nigeria, dont les populations se trouvent, de ce fait, privées de leurs 
ressources halieutiques traditionnelles’). 
57 Cameroon v Nigeria Judgment of 10 October 2002 (n 50) para 223 : ‘[…] those precedents are therefore not 
relevant. The legal question of whether effectivités suggest that title lies with one country rather than another is 
not the same legal question as whether such effectivités can serve to displace an established treaty title’. 
58 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad), Judgment of 3 February 1994, ICJ Reports 1994, 6.  
59 Ibid 13, para 17 (section iv). 
60 Ibid 12, para 17: ‘In the light of the conduct of the parties or other parties , or of the political, secular or 
religious forces, whose conduct bears on the rights and titles claimed by the Parties, and of the conduct of the 
indigenous peoples whose territories are the subject of this dispute (…)’. 
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it extensively discussed these peoples’ and groups’ origin, numbers and location, as well as 
their modus vivendi,61 explaining how they were led by the Senoussi order and were under 
their control and protection prior to independence. Hence, crucial to Libya’s argumentation 
were the indigenous and tribal traditional ways of life, trading patterns, caravan and nomadic 
routes, and religious and educational institutions that were developed in the early twentieth 
century, such as the Zawiyas,62 together with the demonstration of, inter alia, their cultural 
and religious ties with the central Libyan authority.63 Once again however the Court, given 
the existence of a Treaty, found ‘little point in considering what was the pre-1919 situation, 
in view of the fact that the Anglo-French Convention of 8 September 1919 determined the 
precise end-point of the line in question […]’64; and ruled that the fact that the Treaty had 
already delineated the boundaries between the two states ‘renders it unnecessary to consider 
the history of the "Borderlands" claimed by Libya on the basis of title inherited from the 
 
61 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad, Memorial submitted by the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
(Libya’s Memorial), 26 August 1991, Part III, Ch. 2, entitled ‘The indigenous peoples’, 38–54; and Part IV, 
entitled ‘The Impact of colonial expansion on the indigenous peoples: the resulting modus vivendi’, 69–84. 
62 The zawiyas were the ‘urban centres’ of that time, typical Islamic lodges, functioning both as religious 
schools and monasteries). Libya considers the existence of zawiyas as ‘instruments’ of its authority; see, ibid, at 
44, Section 3.44(a) entitled ‘The Role of the Zawiva as an Instrument of Senoussi Authority’; and 3.46, entitled 
‘Senoussi Authoritv and Leadershia in the Libva-Chad Borderland’, with regard to zawivas  (‘built at tribal 
centres, or at watering places and junctions on the trade and pilgrim routes, (which) served as monasteries, 
schools, hostels, sources of advice and mediation and, in due course, as administrative centres’). 
63 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad, Libya’s Memorial (n 61) Part I, Ch I, section 2, entitled ‘The sorts of 
considerations relevant to the resolution of such a dispute’; and Section 3, entitled ‘The unique role of the 
Senoussi’. See also, Part III, Ch II, Section 3, entitled ‘Senoussi Authoritv and Leadership in the Libva-Chad 
Borderlands’ and  ‘The spread of  the Senoussi Order into the Sahara and the Soudan’. 
64 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad), Judgment of 3 February 1994 (n 58) 31, para 60. 
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indigenous people, the Senoussi Order, the Ottoman Empire and Italy.’65 
 
In contrast, in the case of Kasikili/Sedudu Island (1999),66 the Court took into account the 
presence of indigenous peoples as proof of the exercise of territorial sovereignty by 
Namibia.67 In that case, an 1890 Anglo-German treaty had determined the ‘main navigational 
channel’ of the Chobe river as being the boundary line. Yet, the parties identified this channel 
of the river in a different way, with Botswana claiming it referred to the northern channel, 
while Namibia claimed it referred to the southern. Namibia equally claimed that, in the 
alternative, its right could be based on the doctrine of ‘acquisitive prescription’,68 in the sense 
of occupation, use and exercise of sovereign jurisdiction over the Kasikili Island. In order to 
prove it, Namibia referred to ‘10,000 Masubia people who lived on the island’69 and followed 
a traditional way of life: the Masubia had their own patterns of farming and agriculture; 
maintained their own traditional systems of political, legal and judicial organization, 
including the existence of a Masubia Chief (Chikamatondo);70  and they also allegedly had a 
 
65 Ibid 38, para 75. 
66 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia), Judgment of 13 December 1999, ICJ Reports 1999, 1045. 
67 Ibid 1092, para 71. Namibia argued that the people’s presence was relevant not only because it ‘corroborated 
the interpretation of the Treaty’, but also because it gave rise to the application of the ‘doctrines concerning 
acquisition of territory by prescription, acquiescence and recognition’ and because it could prove it had 
continuous, long-standing, unopposed and peaceful possession of the Island since the termination of colonial 
rule (uti possidetis). 
68 Ibid 1093, para 72: ‘ subsequent conduct, which relates to an existing legal instrument, is opposed to 
prescription, the purpose of which is to destroy and to supplant a pre-existing title’. 
69 Botswana v Namibia, Memorial of the Republic of Namibia, Vol. 1, 28 February 1997, paras 14.2, 25 and 
26ff.  
70 Ibid paras 230–1. 
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school and a place to bury their dead.71  The annual floods of the Zambezi for five or six 
months of the year were also a crucial point of the dispute, not only for the identification of 
the thalweg,72 but also for the presence of the people on the island. According to Namibia 
‘when the floods came, the village, including the chief's residence, his court and the school, 
moved to the nearby high ground at Kasika to await the next planting season’;73 whereas 
according to Botswana, ‘this alleged occupation takes the form of the episodic agricultural 
activities on the Island of peasants from the village of Kasika, which is sited within 
Namibia.’74 The Court was therefore bound to examine the extent to which the presence of 
the peoples on the island was relevant to the application of the 1890 treaty,75 as well as to 
acknowledge their nomadic way of life ‘for purposes of agriculture and grazing’.76 It also 
examined whether there were any links of allegiance between the Masubia and the Caprivi 
authorities, before concluding that the Masubia used the island intermittently according to the 
 
71 Ibid paras 209–17 (where Namibia presents ‘corroborative evidence’ as to the presence of the Masubia 
people). In paragraph  207, with respect to the dead, the memorial notes that ‘nothing evidences the importance 
of the Island to the Masubia more strongly than the fact that many members of the community were buried on 
the Island. In this respect, the Island remains today an integral part of the cultural and social heritage of the 
people of the area’. 
72 Scientifically, the main navigational channel could be also defined as the one that carries the main proportion 
of the annual water flow. See Botswana v Namibia, Memorial of the Republic of Namibia (n 69) para 131 and 
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia), Judgment of 13 December 1999 (n 66) 1064, para 29. 
73 Botswana v Namibia, Memorial of the Republic of Namibia (n 69) para 204. 
74 Botswana v Namibia, Counter-memorial of Botswana, Vol.1, November 1997, 1, para 4, and Kasikili/Sedudu 
Island (Botswana v Namibia), Judgment of 13 December 1999 (n 66) 1103, para 94. One of Botswana’s 
counter-claims therefore, consisted, inter alia, of stressing the sporadic nature of that use, as well as the fact that 
people living on the other side of the Chobe river also made use of the island. 
75 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia), Judgment of 13 December 1999 (n 66) 1093–4, paras 71-4. 
76 Ibid, para 74. 
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seasons and their needs, and that the maintenance of any forms of governance was not linked 
to any Namibian territorial claims.77 Even though no cultural claims of any peoples were 
directly involved in the judgment, the Courts considerations have paved the way for more 
substantial considerations of group rights, as discussed in Section III of this chapter.  
 
b) Indigenous peoples’ cultural claims advanced by states in the context of the Court’s 
advisory opinions  
 
In the context of advisory opinions, the Court has been somewhat more generous in 
recognising cultural aspects of collective claims (such as claims to self-determination). Yet, 
here again it has been cautious about making assumptions that extend its jurisdiction to 
questions which have not been asked. In contrast to the contentious cases, such as the West 
Africa cases discussed above,78 the early opinions delivered by the Court have been both 
more substantiated in terms of the findings. 
 
In the Western Sahara case the Mauritanian entity (the indigenous Sahrawi people living in 
Western Sahara already prior the Spanish colonisation and Moroccan occupation) was 
identified by its distinguishable nomadic way of life.79 Both Mauritania and Morocco in fact 
used the presence of indigenous peoples on the disputed territory and the subsequent legal 
ties developed in order to demonstrate their own territorial sovereignty. Mauritania’s 
 
77 Ibid 1106, para 99. 
78 South West Africa, Judgment of 18 July 1966 (n 25) and accompanying text.  
79 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975, ICJ Reports 1975, 12, para 87: ‘Western Sahara (Rio 
de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) is a territory having very special characteristics which, at the time of colonization 
by Spain, largely determined the way of life and social and political organization of the peoples inhabiting it’ 
and para 88 describing their nomadic way of life and religious organization.  
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argument in particular was that the people inhabiting the region were known as ‘the Bilad 
Shinguitti, or Shinguitti country, which constituted a distinct human unit, characterized by a 
common language, way of life and religion’, and placed emphasis ‘on the special 
characteristics of the Saharan area and the nomadic existence of many of the tribes’, going on 
to describe these characteristics in detail.80 Morocco, likewise, described in detail the 
structure of the peoples,81 while only Spain, in its capacity as ‘administering Power’, argued 
that the peoples’ cultural and religious practices were irrelevant and should not serve as a 
‘proof of any tie of allegiance.’82 The Court gave a rather ambiguous answer to the question 
asked, 83 partially aligning itself with Spain’s argument. Yet, one may equally note that it 
adopted a rather dynamic approach, not only by accepting the peoples’ rights to self-
determination, but further by defining the characteristics of the Sahrawi people in a different 
way than the parties   – as ‘tribes or people having a social and political organization’ who 
were actually the inhabitants of the disputed region. In the view of the Court, ‘the nomadic 
peoples of the Shinguitti country should be considered as having […] possessed rights’; and ‘ 
these rights constituted legal ties between the territory of Western Sahara and the 
‘Mauritanian entity’; and ‘[they] knew no frontier between the territories and were vital to the 
very maintenance of life in the region’.84 Interestingly, the Court found that these ties ‘did not 
involve territorial sovereignty or co-sovereignty or territorial inclusion in a legal entity’ and 
that they were, generally, of a different character,85  implying that they could have been of a 
 
80 Ibid 38–60, see particularly para 132(b) and para 137.  
81 Ibid 43, para 94ff.  
82 Ibid 61 paras. 141–43. 
83 Ibid 75, para 10, Declaration by Judge Gros. 
84 Ibid para 152.  
85 Ibid paras 150–51: ‘In the opinion of the Court those ties did not involve territorial sovereignty or co-
sovereignty or territorial inclusion in a legal entity. In consequence, the ‘geographical overlapping’ drawn 
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cultural or religious nature. Furthermore, even though the Court once again did not explicitly 
refer to the peoples’ right to a traditional way of life, it still implicitly recognised it: ‘The 
tribes, in their migrations, had grazing pastures, cultivated lands, and wells or water-holes in 
both territories, and their burial grounds in one or other territory.’86   
 
On the other hand in the Namibia opinion (1971) the Court recognized that ‘the injured entity 
is a people’.87 The Court, inspired perhaps by the then recently proclaimed United Nations 
declarations on self-determination, used human rights phraseology, stressing the precious 
need for the protection of indigenous peoples in the South African territory,88 particularly 





attention to by the two States had, in the Court's view, a different character from that envisaged in the statements 
quoted above.’ 
86 Ibid 152. 
87 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, ICJ Reports 1971, 
16, para 127. 
88 Ibid para 130: ‘…These measures establish limitations, exclusions or restrictions for the members of the 
indigenous population groups in respect of their participation in certain types of activities, fields of study or of 
training, labour or employment and also submit them to restrictions or exclusions of residence and movement in 
large parts of the Territory’ 
89 Ibid para 131: ‘to enforce distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of 
race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute aa denial of fundamental human rights is a 
flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter’. 
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While until now the Court has been consequent in recognising peoples’ right to self-
determination, as well as to ‘entrench’ this right in international law,90 nonetheless in all 
cases in which the Court has considered this principle, it has avoided discussing its cultural 
aspects. For instance, in Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua (1986),91 where the Court 
highlighted the freedom of states to choose their own ‘political, social, economic and 
cultural’ system, it did not substantively extend its analysis so as to explain the modalities of 
what a cultural system would mean. Even more strikingly, in the much anticipated Kosovo 
opinion,92 regarding Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, it avoided considering 
the issue of culture, even though a number of participants had raised the question of cultural 
heritage and cultural determination in the round of negotiations.93 Likewise, in the advisory 
opinion regarding the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
 
90 See Advisory Opinions on Namibia (n 87) and Western Sahara (n 79); also see Case Concerning East Timor 
(Portugal v Australia), Judgment of 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports 1995, 90, paras 102 and 28, where, additionally, 
self-determination is recognised as having an erga omnes character. See generally Gentian Zyberi, ‘Self-
Determination Through the Lens of the International Court of Justice (2009) 56 Netherlands International Law 
Review 429, 450. See also Gentian Zyberi, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Rights of Peoples and 
Minorities’ in Christian Tams and James Sloan (eds), The Development of International Law by the 
International Court of Justice (OUP, 2013) 327, 339ff; Antonio Cassese, ‘The International Court of Justice and 
the Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination’ in Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty Years of 
the International Court of Justice. Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (CUP, 1996) 351. Also, more 
generally, see Shaw ‘The Heritage of States’ (n 46) 97. 
91 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 263. 
92 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, 403. 
93 Ibid 431, para 67. 
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Palestinian Territory,94 the Court made a number of valuable observations (including the 
recognition of applicability of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)95 and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)96 in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory), yet it did not extend its analysis in a way so as to address 
the question of the Palestinian peoples’ right to self-determination in the light of Palestinian 
culture, or the principle of cultural diversity and the need for neighbouring peoples to 
peacefully co-exist.97   
 
3. Towards a Proprio Motu Recognition of Collective Cultural Claims in the New 
Millenium?  
 
The approach of the Court seems to be gradually transforming in the new millennium. One 
judgement of the Court issued in 2009, and two in early and late 2013 respectively, point to 
the enhancement, if not to a proprio motu protection of collective claims  by the Court.  
 
The first case is the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights,98 in which the Court 
had to pronounce itself on the common boundary line between Costa Rica and Nicaragua and 
the navigational regime of the San Juan River. The Court in this case went much further than 
merely acknowledging the existence of inhabitants on the disputed territory, and it is 
 
94 Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, 136. 
95 UNGA Res. 2200A(XXI), adopted on 16 December 1966, entered into force on 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3. 
96 UNGA Res. 45/25, adopted on 20 November 1989, entered into force on 2 September 1990, 1577 UNTS 3. 
97 Even though certain ‘cultural nuances’ may be already perceived; see Eleni Polymenopoulou, ‘Cultural Rights 
in the Case-Law of the International Court of Justice’ (2014) 27 Leiden Journal of International Law 447, 452. 
98 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Judgment of 13 July 2009, ICJ 
Reports 2009, 213.  
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noteworthy that it did so in a case which did not, as such, concern peoples’ rights, nor a 
territorial dispute, nor a claim to self-determination and the application of uti possidetis. Like 
in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, a colonial treaty existed since 1858, purporting to 
establish the exact boundary line on the south side of the river, in favour of Nicaragua. At the 
time of that treaty ‘there was already a population inhabiting the Costa Rican side of the 
boundary thus defined’.99 However, the Court noted straight away that ‘it cannot have been 
the intention of the authors of the 1858 Treaty to deprive the inhabitants of the Costa Rican 
bank of the river [..] of the right to use the river to the extent necessary to meet their essential 
requirements, even for activities of a non-commercial nature […] [T]he parties must be 
presumed [... to] have intended to preserve for the Costa Ricans living on that bank a minimal 
right of navigation for the purposes of continuing to live a normal life in the villages along 
the river.’100 In its submissions to the Court, Costa Rica described the riparians’ situation, and 
explained that their survival depended mostly on agriculture and fishing.101 It went on to state 
that since the filing of the application, Nicaragua had imposed navigational restrictions, 
including the prohibition of fishing for subsistence purposes on the River.102 Ultimately, one 
of the claims of Costa Rica, along with the violation of navigational rights, was the violation 
of ‘the customary rights of fishing by residents of the Costa Rican bank of the River’.103 
 
The Court upheld the customary fishing rights claim in such way that makes the judgement 
 
99 Ibid 246, para 78. 
100 Ibid 246, para 79. 
101 Costa Rica v Nicaragua, Memorial of Costa Rica, 29 August 2006, 8, paras 1.07, 2.06.  
102 Ibid 36, para. 3.28. 
103 Ibid 49, para. 4.05, where Costa Rica explains that since the creation of Costa Rica it was expressly agreed 
that ‘the navigation and fishing and other uses of the said river shall be common’ and that ‘ever since, the 
residents, both Costa Rican and Nicaraguan, along the banks of the San Juan have fished there for subsistence.’  
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noteworthy for at least three reasons. 
  
First, because of the Court’s reasoning. Indeed, the Judges straightforwardly accept that the 
meaning of the word ‘subsistence’ excludes ‘commercial or sport fishing’, even though the 
parties ‘have not attempted to define subsistence fishing (except by those exclusions) nor 
have they asked the Court to provide a definition’.104 The Court employed a fairly broad 
understanding of customary law, without formally looking into customary law requirements 
(state practice and opinio juris)105 and smoothly overcoming Nicaragua’s argument that the 
1858 Treaty did not provide for any fishing rights.106  It merely observed that ‘subsistence 
fishing has without doubt occurred over a very long period’ and that ‘the practice, by its very 
nature, especially given the remoteness of the area and the small, thinly spread population, is 
not likely to be documented in any formal way in any official record’.107  
 
Second, because of the human rights phraseology used throughout the judgement, which 
demonstrates that the ICJ is now fully aware of the human rights developments, such as the 
increasingly positive protection afforded to indigenous peoples and their right to their 
 
104 Costa Rica v Nicaragua, Judgment of 13 July 2009 (n 98) 265, para 141.  
105 The only qualification accepted by the Court to this customary right would be ‘regulatory measures relating 
to fishing adopted for proper purposes, particularly for the protection of resources and the environment’; see ibid 
at 266, para 141, in fine. See also ibid 289, para 20 where, interestingly, Judge Scotnicov goes as far as opining 
that Nicaragua has no right to regulate this practice as such. 
106 Ibid 265, paras 140–44. 
107 Ibid 264, para 137. Notably, this absence of reference has been criticised by Judge Sepùlveda-Amor, who 
suggested that the Court should have followed a different ratio decidendi, referring rather to ‘vested (or 
acquired) rights’ rather than customary law, as observed by Simonetta Stirling-Zanda, ‘Preserving Tradition that 
is Necessary to Exercising Essential Rights: Some Reflections on the ICJ Decision on Navigational Rights on 
the San Juan River’ (2012) 14 International Community Law Review 195, 203. 
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intangible heritage (including their rights to hunting and fishing). Similar findings are pointed 
out in the 2007 UNDRIP and a number of other instruments and human rights documents, 
including the views of the Human Rights Committee.108 This is particularly evident in the 
Court’s observations with respect to the ‘special relationship’ of the riparian communities 
with the river, and when it considered ‘the close connection between the claim relating to 
subsistence fishing and the Application’.109  
 
Third, because of the judgement’s absence of references to older ICJ law (case-law which 
could have been cited) or the PCIJ’s case-law110 in order to establish the point of customary 
fishing rights stands out. This absence of reference was criticised by two concurring 
Judges.111 The fact that the Court did not cite that case law might, however, be significant, 
implying that such a ‘human-centred’ precedent with respect to the protection of individuals, 
and now groups, did not really exist previously, neither in PCIJ case law, nor in the older ICJ 
case-law of the 1950s and 1960s.   
 
108 Polymenopoulou ‘Cultural Rights’ (n 97) 454; also see Stirling-Zanda ‘Preserving Tradition’ (n 107) 196, 
who argues ‘de lege ferenda – that the Court’s findings may suggest a move towards extending forms of 
international legal protection – indirectly and for functional purposes at least – to groups whose traditions are 
necessary to achieve sustainable development including access to essential social and economic rights.’ See 
Chapters 5 by Kamrul Hossain and Chapter 10 by Kristin Hausler in this volume. 
109 Costa Rica v Nicaragua, Judgment of 13 July 2009 (n 98) 263, para 134–5. 
110 Some of the cases which could have been cited would include, for instance, German Settlers in Poland, 
Advisory Opinion of 10 September 1923, PCIJ Ser. B, No. 6; as well as early cases that reached the ICJ, such as 
the Asylum case (Colombia v Peru), Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266; or the Right of 
Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India), Judgment of 12 April 1960, ICJ Reports 1960, 6. 
111 See Costa Rica v Nicaragua, Judgment of 13 July 2009 (n 98) concurring opinion of Judge Sépuldeva-Amor 
and concurring opinion of ad hoc Judge Guillaume who notes that ‘private rights including property rights could 




Consequently, it might legitimately be argued that this judgement somehow marks the 
beginning of an era of strong protection of collective human rights (in casu, cultural rights 
and the protection of a group’s intangible heritage), and in a case where no explicit 
connection was made with either minority or indigenous rights.  
 
The second judgment enhancing the protection of collective cultural rights, almost proprio 
motu, is the Frontier Dispute case (2013).112 This case could be considered a usual boundary 
dispute case, were it not for the presence of a number of indigenous peoples in the disputed 
area – nomads and Bellah people living in the Logomaten area. Hence, the importance of the 
case, like the Navigational rights case, resides precisely in the fact that the final beneficiaries 
of the outcome of the case are these two peoples. Niger raises the issue of their insufficient 
protection through the Treaty law applied in the specific case. Prior to independence, ‘the 
boundary resulting from the 1927 texts raised problems for the nomadic populations, who 
were accustomed to travelling within a unitary area, which was now divided into two separate 
colonies’; 113 while subsequent to independence they faced the ‘problems of registration 
caused by certain differences in the regulations, particularly in regard to the taxation of 
livestock, which continued to encourage nomads to change their territory of origin’.114  It is 
remarkable that, in its consideration of the case, the ICJ, after having adjudicated the merits 
 
112 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Niger), Judgment of 16 April 2013, ICJ Reports 2013, 44. 
113 Burkina Faso v Niger, Memorial of the Republic of Niger, April 2011, 40, para 2.5 (‘in order to retain their 
customary transhumant routes, or even to cultivate their croplands which overlapped the boundary, they had to 
pass from one Colony to the other’). 
114 Ibid 44, para 2.9. 
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of the case,115 and without differentiating between the states’ expressed the wish ‘that each 
Party, in exercising its authority over the portion of the territory under its sovereignty, should 
have due regard to the needs of the populations concerned, in particular those of the nomadic 
or semi-nomadic populations, and to the necessity to overcome difficulties that may arise for 
them because of the frontier’.116 Even though, once again, the ‘populations’ are not 
specifically identified in the text of the judgement as indigenous (but merely as ‘nomadic and 
semi-nomadic populations’), it is implied by this specific part of the judgement that the 
groups have a right to maintain their own cultural identity.  
 
The third case is the Temple of Preah Vihear case  – one of the few cases in which the 
disputed question before the World Court involved the protection of a cultural heritage.117 
 
115 That is, after having identified the frontier. See Burkina Faso v Niger, Judgment of 16 April 2013 (n 112) 48, 
para 111: ‘The Court concludes that, in this section of the frontier, the line consists of a straight-line segment 
between the intersection of the Say parallel with the right bank of the River Sirba and the beginning of the 
Botou bend’. 
116  Ibid para 112. Judge Antonio Cançado-Trindade makes these views of the Court much more explicit, 
making this new understanding of international law also much more explicit. See particularly his Concurring 
opinion, ‘Chapter IX. The human factor and frontiers’. 
117 Another occasion would be, for example,  the opinion that the Court gave regarding the use of nuclear 
weapons. In that case, one dissenting Judge, Judge Weeramantry, pointed to the need for protection of cultural 
monuments, particularly in light of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict (adopted on 14 May 1954, entered into force on 7 August 1956, 249 UNTS 240) as well as   
the Convention Concerning the Protection of World Natural and Cultural Heritage (adopted on 16 November 
1972, entered into force on 17 December 1975, 1037 UNTS 151). See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, 226, at 466-67 (section 3.j. para (iii) et seq.). 
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The order issued in 2011118 and the judgement issued in December 2013119 both concerned 
the interpretation of another, older judgement (1962)120 regarding military activities in the 
territory surrounding the Temple of Preah Vihear – a temple situated on top of a hill at the 
borderline between Cambodia and Thailand, formally under Cambodian sovereignty. In the 
1962 judgement, the Court had merely noted that Thailand was under the obligation to retreat 
its military forces that were ‘stationed by her at the Temple or in the vicinity on Cambodian 
territory.121 Cambodia disputed the meaning of the Court’s findings and argued that this 
‘vicinity on Cambodian territory’ referred in reality to Cambodian territory. As the dispute 
went on, Cambodia, in 2011 (that is, one year after the Temple was included in the UNESCO 
World Heritage List) decided to request the Court to reinterpret its 1962 judgment, as well as 
to indicate provisional measures in order to oblige the Thai forces to be retreated from the 
area of the Temple. The Court issued the provisional measures order as requested. In this 
order, it paid significant attention to the cultural value of the Temple and ruled that both 
parties this time should ‘withdraw all military personnel currently present in the zone as thus 
defined’ and ‘refrain […]also from any armed activity directed at the said zone’, therefore 
implicitly recognizing the need of state cooperation for the protection of cultural heritage.122  
 
118 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah 
Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand), Order of 18 July 2011 (request for the indication of provisional measures), ICJ 
Reports 2011, 537. 
119 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah 
Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand), Judgement of 11 November 2013, ICJ Reports 2013, 281. 
120 Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand), Judgment of 15 June 1962 (mertis), ICJ Reports 1962, 6, 
para 37. 
121 Naturally, the Court then had made no reference to the importance of the Temple as a cultural monument, 
even though the 1954 Hague Convention (n 117) and its First Protocol were already in force. 
122 Cambodia v Thailand, Order of 18 July 2011 (n 118) 554, para 63. Additionally, concurring Judge Trindade 




Even more visibly in the 2013 judgement, while recognizing Cambodia’s sovereignty over 
the whole territory including the ‘vicinity’, the Court made explicit reference to the temple as 
a site of ‘religious and cultural significance for the peoples of the region’.123 Most notably, it 
ruled that both parties should comply not only with its previous order, but also with the 
World Heritage Convention, and that they should further ‘co-operate between themselves and 
with the international community in the protection of the site as a world heritage’.124 With 
this  judgement therefore, the Court paved the way to claim the right to a cultural heritage not 
only as an individual right, but much more significantly as a par excellence collective right: 
one that belongs to all humanity125 rather than to one state or the other. 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
Collective cultural claims are not addressed directly in ICJ jurisprudence since collectivities 
such as minorities or indigenous peoples do not have direct access to the Court. Hence, the 
jurisdiction of the Court to answer questions related to collective cultural claims largely 
depends on the states’ reasons and intentions for bringing such issues to the attention of the 
 
Separate Opinion of Judge Antonio Cançado Trindade, particularly Chapter 10, section 3, entitled ‘Space and 
Time, and the Protection of Cultural and Spiritual World Heritage’, ICJ Reports, 594-598, paras 82-95. 
123  Cambodia v Thailand, Cambodia v Thailand), Judgement of 11 November 2013 (n 119) para 106. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Likewise on this point, see Francesco Francioni, ‘The Evolving Framework for the Protection of Cultural 
Heritage in International Law’, in Silvia Borelli and Federico Lenzerini (eds), Cultural Heritage, Cultural 
Rights, Cultural Diversity: New Developments in International Law (Nijhoff, 2012) 3; and Francesco Francioni, 
‘The Human Dimension of International Cultural Heritage Law: An Introduction’ (2011) 22 EJIL 9. See also 
Andrzej Jakubowski, State Succession in Cultural Property (OUP, 2015) 308. 
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Court. Even when the states have raised collective claims issues, the issue of collective 
cultural rights (such as claims to cultural heritage, religion or education) were not an issue to 
be examined in terms of their benefit for individuals, or the members of groups, or the 
peoples themselves. Collective claims have been brought to the ICJ by states – usually with 
respect to their sovereignty over one territory or another (for example, Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria; Territorial Dispute). Furthermore, in absence of an explicit 
jurisdictional basis, the Court has not used its competence to elaborate collective cultural 
claims issues further in the context of advisory opinions (for example, Kosovo, Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall) – with the exception perhaps only of the 
Western Sahara case, issued in the context of colonisation. It seems however, that in the new 
millennium the Court has made substantial progress in taking into account collectivities’ 
human rights claims, finally overcoming its long-standing reputation of being a ‘conservative 
body’.126 Even though the approach of the Court is still rather cautious in terms of explicitly 
recognising cultural aspects of collective claims, two observations regarding the Court’s 
current practice may lead to positive outcomes in the future. First, the Court now employs a 
more ‘flexible’ understanding of international law, which includes consideration of human 
rights instruments and states’ human rights obligations, including in their cultural dimension 
(for example, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall). Secondly, the Court has 
taken steps towards recognising peoples’ rights to their cultural identity and to their 
intangible heritage (Navigational Rights). Furthermore, in two 2013 cases it has highlighted 
the importance of culture, in its collective dimension,  and imposed obligations to respect 
 
126 See, for example, Francesco Francioni, ‘International “Soft Law”: a Contemporary Assessment’ in 
Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice (CUP, 1996), 
169; W. Michael Reisman, ‘The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: International 
Arbitration and International Adjudication’ (1996) 258 RCADI 9, 233ff. It should be noted, however, that the 
Court had issued much fewer cases during that time. 
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cultural rights to all states involved in the dispute (Frontier Dispute; Temple of Preah 
Vihear). It remains to be seen to what extent this newly–developed approach will gain 
recognition and become more explicit, allowing the Court to attain a central role in the 
vindication of peoples’ claims.    
 
